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Abstract 
Introducing product compatibility associated with network externalities (hereafter, 
network compatibility effects) into a horizontally differentiated duopoly model, we 
consider how network compatibility effects and the level of product substitutability 
affect endogenous timing decisions in the cases of quantity- and price-setting 
competition. In particular, we demonstrate the following. First, given asymmetric 
network compatibility effects between the products of the firms, there is Stackelberg 
equilibrium where the firm providing a product with a larger network compatibility 
effect than some certain level of product substitutability emerges as a leader (follower), 
whereas the firm providing a product with a smaller network compatibility effect than 
some certain level of product substitutability emerges as a follower (leader) in the case 
of quantity (price)-setting competition. Second, the Stackelberg equilibrium is 
Pareto-superior for both firms compared with other equilibria. However, with 
alternative formulation determining network size, with respect to the endogenous 
Stackelberg leader−follower relationship, the revers holds. 
 
Keywords: Stackelberg equilibrium; Nash equilibrium; leader-follower; product 
compatibility; network externality; product substitutability; fulfilled expectations; 
horizontally differentiated products 
JEL classification: D21, D43, D62, L15 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the field of industrial organization, many studies have analyzed the choice of firm 
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roles in market or timing decisions with respect to strategic variables including price, 
quantity, and other firm activities (e.g., R&D, advertising). With the first- and 
second-mover advantage, when comparing the Stackelberg and Cournot−Nash 
equilibria, we find that firms prefer to be leaders (followers) if the strategic relationships 
between them indicate that they are substitutes (complements) with respect to the 
relevant strategic variables, i.e., price and quantity. Equivalently, the same is true if 
negative (positive) slopes of the reaction functions are found in the relevant strategic 
variable space. For example, Gal-Or (1985) demonstrates that firms are willing 
(unwilling) to commit first when the reaction functions are downward (upward) sloping. 
In this case, the firms have a first (second)-mover advantage. Furthermore, Dowrick 
(1986) considers the conditions where firms agree upon the choice of role of leader and 
follower in the Stackelberg duopoly model and demonstrates that each firm prefers to be 
a leader when the slope of the reaction functions is downward. In contrast, each firm 
prefers that the other firm will be the leader when the slope of the reaction functions is 
upward. 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) construct the extended endogenous timing game of an 
observable delay framework and consider the endogenous timing of simultaneous 
versus sequential moves. That is, the players determine both the timing and the action. 
If players choose their actions at different times, then the player choosing a later time 
observes the action taken by the initiating player, giving rise to a sequential-play 
subgame. Thus, Stackelberg equilibrium holds. If the players instead choose actions at 
the same time, then a simultaneous-play subgame takes place. Thus, Nash equilibrium 
holds. As shown below, we use the framework in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), to 
consider the endogenous timing decisions governing quantities and prices, and 
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demonstrate that Stackelberg equilibrium holds given asymmetric network compatibility 
effects between firms.  
In terms of related analysis, Robson (1990) analyzes a model of price-setting 
duopoly including the endogenous choice of strategic timing by introducing timing 
costs into an extended game. Elsewhere, van Dame and Hurkens (1999) consider a 
linear quantity-setting duopoly including asymmetric costs between the firms and 
analyze a two-stage game where each firm can either commit to a quantity in stage 1 or 
wait until stage 2. They show that based on the risk dominance considerations in 
Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the low-cost firm will emerge as the endogenous 
Stackelberg leader, whereas commitment is riskier for the high-cost firm (see also Amir 
and Grillo, 1999). Similarly, van Dame and Hurkens (2004) address a linear 
price-setting duopoly and show that the low-cost firm will emerge as the endogenous 
price leader (see also Amir and Stepanova, 2006).  
In other work, Li (2014) examines price leadership in a vertically differentiated 
product market and shows that the high-quality firm acting as price leader risks 
dominating the other equilibrium when the low-quality firm leads. Finally, using a 
horizontally differentiated duopoly model with linear demand and asymmetric constant 
marginal costs, Yang et al. (2009) compare price and quantity competition under 
endogenous timing and demonstrate that endogenous timing in the price-setting duopoly 
leads to two sequential move games in which one firm moves first and the other firm 
moves second, i.e., two Stackelberg equilibria. Furthermore, they show that endogenous 
timing in the quantity-setting duopoly leads to a simultaneous-move game, in which 
both firms move first, i.e., a Cournot−Nash equilibrium. 
   In the abovementioned studies, the strategic space is assumed to be exogenously 
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given, i.e., a quantity- and price-setting duopoly. However, Singh and Vives (1984) 
consider the endogenous choice of strategic variables, i.e., prices and/or quantities, as 
well as the distribution of roles in duopoly games. That is, provided the products are 
substitutes (complements), it is a dominant strategy for each firm to choose the quantity 
(price) contract (see also Boyer and Moreaux, 1987a, 1987b). 
Further, Tremblay and Tremblay (2011) develop a model in which both the timing of 
play and the strategic choice variables, i.e., quantity and price, are endogenous. They 
show that the dynamic Cournot−Bertrand outcome can be a subgame perfect Nash 
equilibrium, in which the firm choosing quantity (price) moves first (second).1 
Similar issues have also received attention in the context of a vertically 
differentiated duopoly model with a fixed convex cost function for quality. For example, 
Aoki and Prusa (1997) and Aoki (2003) demonstrate that firms select distinctive 
qualities and that a firm producing a high-quality product earns larger profits than a firm 
producing a low-quality product, regardless of the competition mode. In this case, the 
leader (follower) in a sequential Stackelberg game must decide to produce a high (low) 
-quality product. However, because both firms prefer to commit to the production of a 
high-quality product, they both choose to move first. 
Lambertini (1996, 1999) considers endogenous timing with a vertically 
differentiated Bertrand duopoly and demonstrates that if firms endogenously decide the 
timing of quality choices, only simultaneous-move equilibria can arise. Jinji (2004) 
examines this same issue in the context of a vertically differentiated Cournot duopoly 
and establishes that the outcomes of the endogenous timing game depend on whether 
                                                 
1 Tremblay et al. (2013) show that the degree of product differentiation is sufficiently 
large for the Cournot−Bertrand equilibrium to be stable. 
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firms are able to choose their relative position in the quality space before they determine 
the timing of their quality choice. In other words, if firms cannot select their relative 
position, in line with the result in Lambertini (1999), only simultaneous-move equilibria 
persist. In this case, the firms have an incentive to move first because the first mover 
can earn larger profits than the second mover. Alternatively, if both firms can choose 
their relative position, only sequential-move equilibria emerge. In this case, the firm 
choosing to produce the low (high)-quality product decides to be the first (second) 
mover. In a more recent study, Lambertini and Tampieri (2012) determine that a firm 
producing a low (high)-quality product takes the leader’s (follower’s) role in a vertically 
differentiated quantity-setting duopoly model (see also Lambertini and Tedeschi, 2007). 
   We have surveyed the related literature published up to now that addresses the 
distribution of roles in market competition. Furthermore, we refer to the literature 
considering the same issue in the case of the precommitment of the strategic variables, 
such as process (cost reducing) and product (quality improving) R&D, and advertising. 
For example, Amir et al. (2000) consider the endogenous timing of process R&D with 
technology spillovers by applying the frameworks in D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1988) and De Bondt and Henriques (1995).2 In particular, these studies assume that a 
spillover effect arises because a rival firm’s R&D stimulates the availability of 
technological knowledge, i.e., incoming spillovers. They then demonstrate the existence 
of a unique equilibrium in the assignment of the leader and follower roles in which one 
firm that is better at absorbing knowledge spillovers leads and the other firm follows.  
In contrast, Atallah (2005) assumes that a spillover effect arises from the leakage of 
technological information from a rival firm’s R&D. In this case, the result is the 
                                                 
2 See also Tesoriere (2008), and Vandekerckhove and De Bondt (2008). 
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opposite of that presented by Amir et al. (2000) and others. In other words, the first 
mover is a firm that suffers only a small leakage of technological knowledge from its 
own process R&D. Like Atallah (2005), Toshimitsu (2012) considers the distribution of 
roles in product R&D (or advertising) investment competition in the presence of 
demand spillovers and shows that the firm producing that product with low 
(high)-demand spillovers will emerge as the leader (follower), irrespective of the 
competition mode. 
To sum up, the nature of the reaction functions determine the first- or second-mover 
advantage, the endogenous distribution of these roles, and the leader-follower 
relationship. Put differently, these are strategic relationships (i.e., strategic substitutes or 
complements) between firms. In turn, these strategic relationships depend on the 
properties (i.e., substitutes or complements) between products or the strategic variables 
(i.e., quantity or price), as addressed in Boyer and Moreaux (1987a, 1987b). Further, for 
endogenous leadership to hold in a duopolistic game, there are requirements for certain 
asymmetric characteristics between the firms themselves, the attributes of their products, 
and their strategic variables. For example, extending the strategic taxonomy of 
Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), Tombak (2006) examines a “strategic asymmetry” 
two-stage game where one firm regards its rival’s second-stage strategic variable as a 
strategic complement, while the other firm regards its rival’s second-stage strategic 
variable as a strategic substitute.  
   In this paper, by focusing on product compatibility and network externalities, i.e., 
the network compatibility effects, as the characteristics of the products, we reconsider 
the distribution of roles in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. As for the asymmetric 
strategy space (i.e., price vs. quantity) in Tremblay et al. (2011) and the asymmetric 
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product quality (i.e., low vs. high quality) in Lambertini and Tampieri (2012), we 
assume that the degree of network compatibility effects is exogenously given and 
asymmetric. Under these circumstances, we examine endogenous Stackelberg 
leadership in network product and service industries. That is, even though the products 
provided by competing firms are substitutes, at least in terms of horizontal product 
differentiation such as brand names, it is possible for the strategic relationships between 
the firms to be complements. This corresponds well with the properties of products 
associated with network externalities, including internet services in the ITC industry 
and application software (e.g., word processing, spreadsheet, and database products).  
Using this approach, we identify with which of these characteristics a firm (or 
product) will emerge as either a leader or a follower, based on the framework of 
endogenous timing decisions, i.e., the extended game with observable delay as 
developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990). Furthermore, we reconsider that the results 
derived depend on both the competition mode and the formulation of network size. 
 
 
2. Endogenous leader−follower relationship and network compatibility effects 
 
2.1 Cournot−Nash equilibrium and strategic relationships 
We consider quantity competition in a horizontally differentiated product market 
associated with product compatibility and network externalities. Based on the 
framework in Economides (1996), we assume a linear inverse demand function for 
product i as follows: 
),()( eijii SfqqAp    ,,2,1, jiji                           (1) 
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where A  is the intrinsic market size, iq  )( jq  is the quantity of firm i (j), and 
 1,0  represents the degree of product substitutability. The network externality 
function is given by ),( eiSf  where 
e
iS  is the expected network size of firm i. Based 
on the concept of a fulfilled expectations equilibrium presented by Katz and Shapiro 
(1985), we assume that ,i
e
i SS   where iS  is the real network size of firm i. 
Following Chen and Chen (2011), we assume a linear network externality function; 
,)( ii aSSf   where  1,0a  denotes the network externality parameter for network 
size. Furthermore, using equation (3.15) in Shy (2001, p. 62), the network size of firm i 
is given by: 
,jiii qqS   ,,2,1, jiji                                      (2) 
where  ,1,0i  ,2,1i  is the degree of product i’s compatibility with product j. 
Equation (2) implies that firm i will provide a compatible product which the rival firm’s 
product j can operate. If 1i ),0(  ,2,1i  product i operates (does not operate) 
perfectly with product j. Given equation (2), iq ),( jiq  ,,2,1, jiji   is the own 
(incoming) effect on network size. 
Based on equations (1) and (2), the inverse demand function for firm i is given by: 
,)()1( jiii qaqaAp    .,2,1, jiji                        (3) 
Regarding equation (3), we assume that the own-price effect exceeds the cross-price 
effect: i.e., ,
j
i
i
i
dq
dP
dq
dP   .,2,1, jiji   Thus, it follows that ,1 iaa    .2,1i  
Although the products are horizontally differentiated in terms of their intrinsic 
attributes, i.e., ,01   the relationship between the products will be complementary 
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(substitutionary) in terms of their operational properties if the degree of product 
compatibility with the network externality is larger (smaller) than that of their product 
substitutability, i.e., ,)(  ia .2,1i  As shown below, the nature of the products 
determines the strategic relationships between the firms and the external effects on their 
profits. Hereafter, we denote product compatibility with a network externality as the 
network compatibility effect, i.e., .ia  To simplify the analysis, we assume that 
production costs are zero. Thus, the profit function is ,iii qp .2,1i   
In view of equation (3), we derive the reaction function for firm i as follows. 
,
)1(2)1(2 j
i
i qa
a
a
Aq 

  .,2,1, jiji                            (4) 
Given equation (4), the strategic relationship between the firms depends on the degree 
of product substitutability and network compatibility effect: 
,)(0)( i
j
i a
q
q  

.,2,1, jiji                             (5) 
Equation (5) implies that a strategic substitutionary (complementarity) relationship 
between the firms arises if the degree of product substitutability is larger (smaller) than 
that of the network compatibility effect. In particular, even though the two products are 
substitutable, a relationship of strategic complementarity arises under quantity 
competition when . ia  
Using the first-order condition to maximize profit, the profit function is represented 
by   ,)1( 2iiii qaqp  .2,1i  Thus, we derive the external effect of an increase in 
firm j on the profit of firm i as follows: 
,)(0)()1(2 i
j
i
i
j
i a
q
qqa
q
 


.,2,1, jiji                  (6) 
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   For the following analysis, we assume asymmetric compatibility between the firms: 
 
Assumption 1 .01 21    
 
Given equation (4), we derive the following Cournot–Nash equilibrium: 
 ,)()1(2
D
aaAq iNi
   ,2,1i                              (7) 
where 0))(()1(4 21
2   aaaD  and ,0)()1(2  iaa  .2,1i  
Both of these conditions are satisfied because the own-price effect exceeds the 
cross-price effect. Given equation (7), superscript N denotes the Cournot−Nash 
equilibrium. 
Taking equations (5) and (6) into account, we categorize the Cournot–Nash 
equilibrium across three cases. In case (i) ((ii)), a strong (weak) network compatibility 
effect arises: ,)( ia   ,2,1i  When a strong (weak) network compatibility effect 
arises, according to the strategic complementarity (substitutionary) relationship under 
quantity competition, the reaction curves for both firms are upward (downward) sloping. 
See Figure 1 (2). In case (iii), where asymmetric network compatibility effects arise, i.e., 
,21  aa   the reaction curve of firm 1 (2) is upward (downward) sloping.3 See 
Figure 3.  
 
2.2 Endogenous leader−follower decision and a natural Stackelberg situation  
Applying the framework of endogenous timing decisions, i.e., the extended game 
                                                 
3 It is characterized by a game with strategic heterogeneity (see Monaco and Sabarwal, 
2015). One player exhibits a strategic complement and the other a strategic substitute. 
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with observable delay developed by Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), we demonstrate an 
endogenous leader−follower decision and derive a natural Stackelberg situation.  
We assume firm j (i) is a leader (follower). Considering equation (4), we derive the 
Stackelberg equilibrium under quantity competition as follows: 
 
,
))((
)()1(2
21 

aaD
aaA
q jLj 
                                     (8) 
  ,
)})((){1(2
))(1(2
21 

aaDa
aaDAq iFi 
                             (9) 
where .,2,1, jiji   We can similarly obtain the outcomes in the case of the opposite 
roles, i.e., firm j (i) is a follower (leader). Given equations (8) and (9), superscript L (F) 
denotes the leader (follower) in the Stackelberg equilibrium. 
Using equations (7), (8), and (9), and comparing the quantities in the Nash 
equilibrium and in the Stackelberg equilibrium, we derive the following relationships: 
,0)())(()(  jiNjLj aaqq                            (10) 
,0)()(  iNjFj aqq                                     (11) 
,0)())(()(  jiFjLj aaqq                            (12) 
where .,2,1, jiji   
We now compare the profits in the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. Given 
Assumption 1, and considering equations (6), (10), (11), and (12), we derive the 
following results as in Lemma 1. 
 
Lemma 1 
(i) If ,1 21   aa  then NiFiLi qqq   and ,NiLiFi    .2,1i   
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(ii) If ,021   aa  then FiNiLi qqq   and ,FiNiLi    .2,1i  
(iii) If ,01 21   aa  then ,111 LFN qqq   ,222 LNF qqq   ,111 FNL    
and .222
NLF    
 
In Lemma 1 (i), where the degree of the network compatibility effect is larger than 
that of product substitutability, both firms prefer being the follower to being the leader 
and to playing a simultaneous-move game. In particular, both firms have a 
second-mover advantage. Thus, considering Theorem V (A. ii) in Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990) and Lemma 1 in Yang, et al. (2009), there are multiple equilibria in the extended 
game with observable delay, i.e., two Stackelberg equilibria. See 1S  and 2S  in Figure 
1. 
In Lemma 1 (ii), if the degree of the network compatibility effect is smaller than that 
of product substitutability, both firms prefer being the leader to being the follower and 
to playing a simultaneous-move game. In this case, both firms have a first-mover 
advantage. Thus, considering Theorem V (A. i) in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and 
Lemma 2 in Yang, et al. (2009), there is a unique simultaneous-move game equilibrium 
in the extended game with observable delay, i.e., a Cournot−Nash equilibrium. See N
in Figure 2. 
In Lemma 1 (iii), there is asymmetry between the firms with respect to the degree of 
the network compatibility effect. That is, if the degree of the network compatibility 
effect for firm 1 (2) is larger (smaller) than that of the product substitutability, firm 1 
prefers being the leader to being the follower and to playing a simultaneous-move game, 
whereas firm 2 prefers being the follower to being the leader and to playing a 
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simultaneous-move game. Thus, considering Theorem V (B) in Hamilton and Slutsky 
(1990), the sequential move game equilibrium in the extended game with observable 
delay is unique, i.e., a Stackelberg equilibrium. See 1S  in Figure 3. 
Here, we use the definition of a Natural Stackelberg Situation (NSS) presented by 
Albaek (1990) as follows. 
 
Definition  
In a NSS, one firm prefers being the leader to being the follower and to playing a 
simultaneous-move game, and the other firm prefers being the follower to being the 
leader and to playing a simultaneous-move game. 
 
Furthermore, we assume the necessary condition for a NSS to hold as follows. 
 
Assumption 2 .a  
 
Otherwise, i.e., ,a  the strategic relationship under quantity competition is 
always substitutionary, irrespective of the product compatibility level (i.e., i ). Based 
on Lemma 1 (ii), there is a unique Cournot−Nash equilibrium. Therefore, we summarize 
the analysis above as Proposition 1. 
 
Proposition 1  
There is a NSS where the firm providing the product with a larger (smaller) network 
compatibility effect than a certain product substitutability level is the leader (follower) 
under quantity competition. 
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   Because the degree of the network compatibility effect is larger (smaller) than that 
of product substitutability, a(n) increase (decrease) in the output of the rival firm 
increases the profit of the relevant firm. In this case, the firm providing the product 
where the degree of the network compatibility effect is larger than that of product 
substitutability has a strong incentive to choose being a first mover so as to commit a 
small amount of output, i.e., .111
LFN qqq   On the other hand, the firm providing the 
product where the degree of the network compatibility effect is smaller than that of the 
product substitutability prefers being a second mover to a first mover because the small 
output of the rival firm increases its profit. As a result, the natural Stackelberg situation 
under quantity competition holds where this equilibrium is Pareto-superior for both 
firms when compared with the other equilibria. 
 
 
3. Price competition and an alternative formulation of network size  
 
3. 1 Bertrand−Nash equilibrium and strategic relationships 
Taking equation (3) into account, we derive the direct demand function of firm i as 
follows. 
,
))(()1(
)()1()}()1{(
21
2 

aaa
papaAaa
q jiiii 
  .,2,1, jiji      (13) 
Based on equation (13), the reaction function for firm i is given by 
,
)1(2)1(2
)}()1{(
j
ii
i pa
a
a
Aaap 

   .,2,1, jiji               (14) 
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Thus, the strategic relationship between the firms depends on the degrees of product 
substitutability and the network compatibility effect as follows: 
,)(0)( i
j
i a
p
p  

.,2,1, jiji                             (15) 
Equation (15) implies that a strategic complementarity (substitutionary) relationship 
between the firms holds if the degree of product substitutability is higher (lower) than 
that of the network compatibility effect. In particular, even though the two products are 
substitutable, a relationship of strategic substitutionary is sustained under price 
competition when .ia   
Furthermore, we derive the external effect of an increase the price of firm j on the 
profit of firm i as follows: 
,)(0)( i
j
i a
p
 

.,2,1, jiji                             (16) 
Given equation (14), we derive the following Bertrand–Nash equilibrium: 
 ,))(())(1()1(2 212
D
aaaaaAp iBNi
   ,2,1i      (17) 
where 0))(())(1()1(2 21
2   aaaaa i .2,1i  This condition is 
satisfied because the own-price effect exceeds the cross-price effect. Given equation 
(17), superscript BN denotes the Bertrand−Nash equilibrium. 
Taking equations (15) and (16) into account, we categorize the Bertrand–Nash 
equilibrium into three cases. In case (i) ((ii)), where a strong (weak) network 
compatibility effect, i.e., ,)( ia   ,2,1i  holds, according to the strategic 
substitutionary (complementarity) relationship under price competition, the reaction 
curves of both firms are downward (upward) sloping. See Figure 2 (1). The strategic 
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relationships in these two cases lie opposite to those under the quantity competition case. 
In case (iii), where the asymmetric network compatibility effect, i.e., ,21  aa   
arises, the reaction curve of firm 1 (2) is downward (upward) sloping. See Figure 4. 
 
3.2 Endogenous leader−follower decision and a NSS  
By following the same procedure as in quantity-setting competition, we derive the 
leader’s price in the Stackelberg equilibrium: 
 
.
))((
))(())(1()1(2
21
21
2


aaD
aaaaaA
p jBLj 
             (18) 
Substituting equation (18) into equation (14), we obtain the follower’s price: 
  ,
)})((){1(2
)()1(
21 

aaDa
GaHaAp iBFi 
                           (19) 
where 0))((2 21   aaDH  and .0))(()1(2 212   aaaG
Given equations (18) and (19), superscript BL (BF) denotes a leader (follower) in a 
Stackelberg equilibrium.4 
Using equations (15), (17), (18), and (19), with respect to the prices in the Nash 
equilibrium and in the Stackelberg equilibrium, we derive the following: 
,0)())(()(  jiBNjBLj aapp                          (20) 
,0)()(  iBNjBFj app                                   (21) 
,0)())(()(  jiBFjBLj aapp                          (22) 
where .,2,1, jiji   
We also compare the profits in the Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. Under 
                                                 
4 Because 0)})(()1{(2 21
2   aaaGH  and iaa  1  hold, it 
follows that .0BFip  
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Assumption 1, and equations (16), (20), (21), and (22), with respect to prices and profits, 
we derive the following outcomes as in Lemma 2 (see Figures 1, 2, and 4). 
 
Lemma 2 
(i) If ,1 21   aa  then BFiBNiBLi ppp   and ,BFiBNiBLi    .2,1i   
(ii) If ,021   aa  then BNiBFiBLi ppp   and ,BNiBLiBFi    .2,1i  
(iii) If ,01 21   aa  then ,111 BLBNBF ppp   ,222 BLBFBN ppp   
,111
BNBLBF    and .222 BFBNBL    
 
In Lemma 2 (i), where the degree of the network compatibility effect is larger than 
that of product substitutability, both firms prefer being the leader to being the follower 
and to playing a simultaneous-move game. That is, both firms have a first-mover 
advantage. Thus, considering Theorem V (A. i) in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and 
Lemma 2 in Yang et al. (2009), there is a unique simultaneous move equilibrium in the 
extended game with observable delay, i.e., a Bertrand−Nash equilibrium. See N in 
Figure 2. 
In Lemma 2 (ii), where the degree of the network compatibility effect is smaller than 
that of product substitutability, both firms prefer being the follower to being the leader 
and to playing a simultaneous-move game. That is, both firms have a second-mover 
advantage. Thus, considering Theorem V (A. ii) in Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) and 
Lemma 1 in Yang et al. (2009), there are multiple equilibria in the extended game with 
observable delay, i.e., two Stackelberg equilibria. See 1S  and 2S  in Figure 1. 
In Lemma 2 (iii), there is asymmetry between the firms in terms of with the degree 
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of the network compatibility effect. That is, when the degree of the network 
compatibility effect of firm 1 (2) is larger (smaller) than that of product substitutability, 
firm 1 prefers being the follower to being the leader and to playing a 
simultaneous-move game, whereas firm 2 prefers being the follower to being the leader 
and to playing a simultaneous-move game. Thus, considering Theorem V (B) in 
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), the sequential move equilibrium in the extended game 
with observable delay is unique, i.e., a Stackelberg equilibrium. See 2S  in Figure 4. 
   Therefore, given Assumption 2, we summarize the above analysis as Proposition 2. 
 
Proposition 2 
There is a NSS where the firm providing the product with a strong (weak) network 
compatibility effect is the follower (leader) under price competition. 
 
   This result in Proposition 2 is contrary to that in Proposition 1. That is, the firm 
having weak (strong) network compatibility is the Stackelberg price leader (follower). If 
the network compatibility effect is smaller (larger) than a certain level of product 
substitutability, a(n) increase (decrease) in the price of the rival firm increases the profit 
of the firm. In this case, the firm providing the product with a weak network 
compatibility effect has an incentive to choose to be the first mover and to commit the 
lowest price, i.e., .222
BLBFBN ppp   On the other hand, the firm providing the product 
with a strong network compatibility effect prefers being the second mover to the first 
mover because the low price of the rival firm, i.e., ,2BLp  increases its profit. As a result, 
the natural Stackelberg situation under price competition arises. This equilibrium is 
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Pareto-superior for both firms compared with the other equilibria.  
   Furthermore, without the network compatibility effect, i.e., ,2,1,0  ia i  it 
follows that the follower’s price is lower than the leader’s price, similar to the 
equilibrium price in the standard Stackelberg competition. However, it follows in our 
model that BLBF pp 21   because .21  aa   That is, the follower can set a higher 
price than the leader’s price because the follower’s product is sufficiently compatible 
with the leader’s product.  
 
3.3 Alternative formulation of network size   
With respect to the formulation of network size, Chen and Chen (2011) assume: 
,jjii qqS   ,,2,1, jiji                                     (23) 
where jjq  implies the spillover (or leakage) effect from firm j on the network size of 
firm i. That is, firm j provides a product that a user of product i can operate and that 
works in product i. Here, we also assume .21  aa   
   Under quantity competition, we change equations (5) and (6) as follows: 
,)(0)( j
j
i a
q
q  

                                       (24) 
,)(0)( j
j
i a
q
 

                                       (25) 
where .,2,1, jiji   Thus, the strategic relationships and the external effect depend 
on the level of product substitutability and the rival firm’s network compatibility effect. 
That is, if the rival firm provides the product with the network compatibility effect 
larger (smaller) than a certain level of product substitutability, the reaction curve for the 
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competing firm is upward (downward) sloping and the external effect on profit is 
positive (negative). Therefore, the firm providing the product with a strong (weak) 
network compatibility effect will emerge as the follower (leader) under quantity-setting 
competition. This result lies opposite to Proposition 1. 
   Similarly for price-setting competition, we obtain the following: 
,)(0)( j
j
i a
p
p  

                                       (26) 
,)(0)( j
j
i a
p
 

                                       (27) 
where .,2,1, jiji   If the rival firm provides the product with the network 
compatibility effects larger (smaller) than some level of product substitutability, then the 
reaction curve of the firm is downward (upward) sloping and the external effect on the 
profit is negative (positive). Therefore, the firm providing the product with a strong 
(weak) network compatibility effect will emerge as the leader (follower) under 
price-setting competition. This result lies opposite to Proposition 2. 
 
 
4. Conclusion  
 
In the model in this paper, the properties of a firm-specific product, i.e., product 
substitutability and network compatibility, determine the strategic relationships and the 
external effects. In particular, we have demonstrated that, in a quantity (price)-setting 
duopoly, if the network compatibility effect is smaller than a certain level of product 
substitutability, the strategic relationship of the rival firm regarding the firm is 
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substitutionary (complementarity) and the external effect on the rival firm’s profit is 
negative (positive). In general, if the strategic relationship of the rival firm regarding the 
firm is one of substitutionary (complementarity) and the external effect on the rival 
firm’s profit is negative (positive), then the firm chooses to be the leader (follower) 
within the framework of an endogenous timing decision game. Based on this result, we 
showed that given asymmetric network compatibility effects between the firms’ 
products, the firm providing the product with a larger (smaller) network compatibility 
effect than a certain level of product substitutability is the Stackelberg leader under 
quantity (price) competition. In other words, we propose that a natural Stackelberg 
situation holds in a game with strategic heterogeneity. 
   We appreciate that our model depends on specific assumptions, e.g., linearity of the 
functions. However, by focusing on the properties of the products associated with 
network externalities and compatibility, we have illustrated which effects of these 
properties determine the endogenous distribution of roles, i.e., Stackelberg leadership. 
Further, although we assumed exogenously determined product compatibility, we 
should consider the level of product compatibility as a firm’s strategic variable. Thus, 
we should examine Stackelberg leadership in the context of endogenous product 
compatibility choice (see, e.g., Toshimitsu, 2014). For similar reasons, although we 
assume that the asymmetric network compatibility effects are also exogenously given, 
we should consider how asymmetric network compatibility effects arise between firms. 
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Figure 1  
Strong network compatibility effects:   21 aa  
ii qz   or ,ip  .2,1i  
The shaded area represents the Pareto-superior sets. 
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Figure 2  
Weak network compatibility effects: 21  aa   
ii qz   or ,ip  .2,1i  
The shaded area represents the Pareto-superior sets. 
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Figure 3  
Quantity-setting duopoly with asymmetric network compatibility effects: 21  aa   
1S is a natural Stackelberg situation where firm 1 (2) is the leader (follower). 
The shaded area represents the Pareto-superior sets. 
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Figure 4  
Price-setting duopoly with asymmetric network compatibility effects: 21  aa   
2S is a natural Stackelberg situation where firm 2 (1) is the leader (follower). 
The shaded area represents the Pareto-superior sets. 
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